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Chapter 1  
Climate Change and Spatial Planning Responses 
Simin Davoudi, Jenny Crawford and Abid Mehmood 
 
The climate change issue is part of the larger challenge of sustainable 
development. As a result, climate change policies can be more effective when 
consistently embedded within broader strategies designed to make national 
and regional development paths more sustainable (IPCC, 2001, p.4) 
 
[a]Introduction 
Understanding the impacts of cyclical cooling and warming of the Earth’s climate has 
made an important contribution to our knowledge of the evolution and distribution of 
populations and ecosystems. Incorporating this understanding into contemporary 
human development processes is, however, a major challenge. We realise that human 
use of the atmosphere as a carbon sink has systemic impacts that translate into 
significant social, economic and environmental costs. Given that these costs are 
hugely unpredictable in terms of location, nature and scale, we face risks that we had 
not factored into our decision-making processes. Our physical connections and 
interdependencies with nature are being demonstrated in inescapably practical terms. 
These realisations are changing both the context and the nature of spatial planning at 
all levels.  
The relationship between energy use, development and climate has renewed the focus 
of planning analysis and policy on the complexity and uncertainty of environmental, 
social and economic systems. This is forcing a reassessment of how planners envisage 
development and the scope and appraisal of planning interventions.  Climate change 
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therefore raises profound professional, technical, theoretical and ethical issues for 
planners. Climate change awareness is now shaping the sustainable development 
debate, further strengthening the critiques of dominant development pathways and 
raising interest in alternative development policy responses at different scales and in 
different places. It advocates searching for new opportunities, new tools and new 
rationales. Planners are being asked to reconcile, trade and, indeed, overturn short-
term and long-term expectations for development. They need to address questions 
such as:  what will low carbon, ‘climate-proof’ settlement look like in terms of urban 
form and infrastructure; what are the barriers to effective planning for such 
development; what are the implications for governance, from transnational to local 
levels, and the relationship between these levels; who will bear the risks and what are 
the implications for equity and social development? Current evidence and research 
raise yet more questions and many of the related projections are bleak. However, 
planners like to cast themselves as being ‘in the business of hope’: believing that 
knowledge and debate are powerful levers to finding policy and implementation 
solutions that meet complex social, economic and environmental needs. This has been 
an important motivation for this book. 
This chapter aims to set the context for subsequent chapters by providing an overview 
of how the science of climate change is informing policy and the frameworks that are 
emerging in response at both transnational and national levels. It asks: how do we 
know that the world is warming and that human activities are responsible for it; what 
will be the main impacts of climate change; who are the main emitters of greenhouse 
gasses and who are going to suffer most from the effects of a changing climate? The 
chapter then outlines the global policy framework before focusing on the nature of 
spatial planning and its contribution to climate change responses.  
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[a]The Science of Climate Change  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change uses the term 
‘climate change’ to refer specifically to ‘a change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods’. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
uses the term with respect to ‘any change in climate over time, whether due to natural 
variability or as a result of human activity’ (IPCC, 2001, p21). Importantly, the 
changes we face are a result of both processes as a range of natural and human factors 
drive changes in atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG)
1
 and aerosols, 
solar radiation, and land surface properties. These in turn alter the energy balance of 
the climate system i.e. exerting warming or cooling influences on global climate. 
These changes are expressed in terms of radiative forcing.
2
 Increases in GHG, 
including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) tend to 
warm the Earth’s surface.  IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report is unequivocal that the 
Earth’s climate has warmed by 0.74 degrees Celsius (°C) since 1900, through 
increases in GHG emission (IPCC, 2007a). Between 1970 and 2004, global human-
induced GHG emissions have grown by 70 percent.  
Complex systems such as climate have an inherent tendency to maintain states of 
equilibrium. As a result, some impacts of anthropogenic (man-made) climate change 
may be slow to become apparent. At the same time, effects are likely to last. Thus, 
even after GHG concentrations are stabilised, anthropogenic warming and sea level 
rise will continue for centuries due to the timescales associated with climate processes 
and feedbacks. For instance, if concentrations of GHG and aerosols could be held at 
year 2000 levels, the IPCC (2007a) estimates that a 0.2°C warming would still be 
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expected over the next twenty years. Beyond certain thresholds, some impacts could 
be irreversible. For example, ‘major melting of the ice sheets and fundamental 
changes in the ocean pattern could not be reversed over a period of many human 
generations’ (IPCC, 2001, pp16-17). 
The IPCC’s forecasts for future climate change are based on the use of a range of 
alternative emissions scenarios. For the next two decades its best estimates are for an 
overall warming of about 0.4°C. Depending on the level at which global carbon 
emissions peak and begin to fall, increases of between 1.4 and 5.8°C. are projected for 
the period 1990 to 2100. This is 2 to 10 times larger than the observed warming 
during the 20
th
 century (IPCC, 2007a). Indeed the IPCC warns that the projected rate 
of increase in the 21
st
 century ‘is very likely to be without precedent during at least 
the last 10,000 years’ (IPCC, 2001, p8), and that ‘GHG forcing in the 21
st
 century 
could set in motion large-scale, high-impact, non-linear, and potentially abrupt 
changes in physical and biological [as well as social and economic] systems over the 
coming decades to millennia’, some of which ‘could be irreversible’ (IPCC, 2001, 
p14).   
[b]Anthropogenic emissions 
In 2008, the level of GHG in the atmosphere was about 430 parts per million (ppm) 
compared with 280ppm before the Industrial Revolution. This is estimated to reach 
550ppm by 2050 at the current rate of increase, but given that the levels are rising 
faster than expected, the 550ppm could be reached as early as 2035  (HM Treasury, 
2006). The emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) which is the most important 
anthropogenic GHG increased by 80% in that time (IPCC, 2007a, p5). Global 
increases in CO2 concentrations are due mainly to fossil fuel use and to a lesser extent 
land-use change. Increases in methane (CH4) concentrations are predominantly due to 
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agriculture and fossil fuel use. The sectors which were most responsible for growth in 
GHG emissions between 1970 and 2004 include the energy supply sector 
(contributing to an increase of 145%), transport (120%), industry (65%) and land use, 
land use change and forestry (40%).
3
 Between 1970 and 1990, direct emissions from 
agriculture grew by 27% and from buildings by 26%. The latter has remained at 
roughly the 1990 levels thereafter. However, when taking into account the energy use 
of the buildings, the total direct and indirect emissions amount to 75% (IPCC, 2007b). 
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of GHG emissions in 2000 by sector. 
 
Figure 1.1 World greenhouse-gas emissions by sector 2000, % 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 HERE] 
Source: Adapted from: The Economist, 2007, p4, survey 
 
Two important drivers of the rise in energy-related emissions are global population 
growth (up by 69%) between 1970 and 2004 and the increase in per capita income (up 
by 77%). These figures refer to global average. The contribution of individual 
countries to global warming varies substantially between the rich and the poor. In 
2004, for instance, high-income nations accounted for 20% of world population, 
produced 57% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and generated 46% of global GHG 
emissions (IPCC, 2007b). Per capita emissions from developing countries in 2004 
were one quarter of per capita emissions from developed countries. While a 
progressive decoupling of income growth from GHG emissions has taken place 
through measures such as reducing the energy intensity (33% decease in energy used 
per unit of GDP), the level of improvement has not been sufficient to counteract the 
global rise in emissions.  
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The scale and location of emissions is also highly differentiated below the national 
level with an ongoing debate about the role of cities gaining increasing currency.  
Satterthwaite (2008, pp 539-540), for example, has challenged the assertion that, 
‘cities are responsible for about 75 percent of the heat-trapping greenhouse gases that 
are released into our atmosphere’, and instead estimates that the figure is nearer 30-
40%. Any such estimates, of course, mask the effects of huge variations in relative 
wealth. For example, total GHG emissions ranged from 44.3 million tonnes (mt) in 
London in 2006 to 64.8mt in Mexico City in 2000 and a mere 1.8mt in Dhaka in 
1999. The per capita emissions were respectively: 6.18, 3.6 and 1.7 tonnes; i.e. much 
higher in the wealthy city of London than in Mexico City or Dhaka (Romero Lankao, 
2007; Dodman, 2009f).    
In determining spatial differences in emissions, however, a crucial point is the issue of 
attribution i.e. how are the geographical boundaries of settlements defined for the 
purposes of carbon emissions? Do they, for instance, correspond with the 
administrative (municipality), the metropolitan (contiguous built up area), or the 
functional (city-region) boundaries? (see Davoudi, 2008 for detailed discussions) 
Boundary definition has major implications for attributing GHG emissions to cities 
and ‘non-cities’. Often major emitters such as power stations, landfill sites, or even 
large factories are located in ‘rural’ areas. Furthermore, activities such as aviation, 
shipping and other major transportation do not respect physical boundaries and while 
they cannot be directly attributed to ‘cities’, they are likely to be driven by city-based 
consumption.  Overall, it is misleading to focus on a particular settlement type (such 
as cities) in attributing GHG (or CO2) emissions, because as Satterthwaite (2008, 
p547) stresses, ‘the driver of most anthropogenic carbon emissions is the consumption 
patterns of middle- and upper-income groups, regardless of where they live, and the 
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production systems that profit from their consumption’. However, this is not to 
suggest that the spatial dimensions of settlements are not key drivers of emissions, as 
explored in detail in subsequent chapters in this volume.  
[b]Impacts of climate change 
As global temperature increases, the models reviewed by the IPCC show an 
increasing risk of extreme weather events, including destructive storms, floods and 
droughts. They predict the melting of both sea ice and glaciers and changes in season 
that are being corroborated by measurements on the ground. Different global regions 
are expected to experience different changes as a result of global warming. For 
example, while Europe is expected to experience an increase in inland flash floods, 
Africa will see a rise in arid and semi-arid land (IPCC, 2007a). Projected patterns of 
warming will have increasingly significant impacts on various terrestrial, marine and 
coastal ecosystems, as well as on water resources, particularly in dry regions and 
agriculture in low latitudes and low-lying coasts. Some of these impacts are 
irreversible. For example, 20-30% of species assessed so far are likely to be at 
increased risk of extinction if the rise in global average warming exceeds 1.5-2.5 °C 
relative to 1980-1999 (IPCC, 2007a). Projected changes would transform the physical 
geography of the world with millions of people facing starvation, water shortages or 
homelessness. Even a one meter rise in sea level
4
 would flood 17% of Bangladesh 
land mass and threaten coastal cities such as London and New York (The Economist, 
2006a, p8 survey). 
The nature and intensity of impact will vary depending on the vulnerability of 
different places. Vulnerability is a function of both exposure and sensitivity. The 
former refers to the character, magnitude and rate of climate change and variability to 
which places are exposed. The latter refers to places’ adaptive capacity. Hence, 
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vulnerability is the extent to which people, places, economic sectors and 
infrastructures are prone to the adverse affects of climate change. As will be discussed 
later, adaptive capacity is as important as the level of exposure in determining the 
extent to which places can attenuate climate stresses. 
 The level of vulnerability differs not only between places, but also between 
population groups. Differences in demographic and socio-economic profiles affect the 
level of vulnerability considerably. Hence, children and elderly are often the most 
vulnerable groups, as are those who already suffer from poor health or are unable to 
cope with injuries and illnesses caused by the impact of climate change. Similarly, 
those who lack the capacity to reduce the direct and indirect impacts of climate 
change on their well being are also among vulnerable groups. These are lower-income 
groups with little resources at their disposal to, for example, move to safer areas, l 
insure their assets or gain access to adequate water, electricity, sanitation, sewage, and 
other basic utilities (Satterthwaite et al, 2007; Halsnaes and Laursen, this volume). 
Previous incidents have shown the disproportionate impacts of climate extremes on 
vulnerable groups. For example, most of the 20,000 lives claimed by the European 
heat wave of 2003 were among the poor and isolated elderly; as were the majority of 
the 1101 people who died in Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 
(Wilbanks et al, 2007).   
[a]The Global Policy Context 
The global policy context for climate change, and other global environmental issues, 
have been predominantly shaped by the United Nations (UN). Its 1972 Conference on 
the Human Environment in Stockholm prompted the creation of the UN World 
Commission on Environment and Development in 1983, which produced their famous 
Brundtland Report: Our Common Futures in 1987. One year later, the UN 
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Environment Programme along with the World Meteorological Organization 
established the IPCC to assess published scientific evidence about human impacts on 
climate and the options for mitigation and adaptation. Since then, the IPCC’s periodic 
reports (of which the fourth one was published in 2007) have become an authoritative 
reference for tracking climate change and its impacts. Another significant UN 
conference was the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro which led to the 
establishment of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 
convention became the driving force behind the Kyoto Protocol which was adopted in 
1997 and came to force in 2005. Together the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have 
established a global policy framework for climate change which underlies an array of 
national policies. They have also created an international carbon market and set up 
new institutional mechanisms to provide the foundation for future climate policies.  
As of 2008, 180 nations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which sets binding targets 
to reduce GHG emissions to an average of 5% against 1990 levels over the period 
2008 and 2012, when the first Kyoto Protocol ends. The exact target for each member 
state varies depending on their historic emission levels and capacity to change. The 
UK, for example, is committed to achieving a 12.5% reduction. More importantly, the 
largest per capita polluter in the world - the Unites States- failed to sign up to any 
mandatory targets. This remained the case even after the UN Climate Change 
Conference, in December 2005 in Montreal, where negotiations over post-2012 
emission reductions were taking place. By contrast, the EU has fully supported the 
Protocol. In 2005, its European Climate Change Programme set up the EU Emissions-
Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
5
 aimed at cutting emissions from the EU’s major polluting 
industries and meeting Kyoto targets. However, progress towards meeting the Kyoto 
targets has varied across the EU and over time. For example, the UK put forward its 
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own ambitious target of cutting CO2 emissions from their 1990 level by 20% by 
2010, but failed to meet it. By 2006 it became clear that CO2 emissions had been 
rising every year since 2002 (The Economist, 2006b, p25). However, more recently, 
the UK Climate Change Act, 2008, introduced legally binding GHG emission 
reduction targets, through action in the UK and abroad, of at least 80% by 2050, and 
reductions in CO2 emissions of at least 26% by 2020, against a 1990 baseline. Several 
other international organisations (such as the World Bank) have also responded to the 
call for tackling climate change by putting forward policy measures, financial 
assistance and awareness raising activities. While climate change is a global problem 
requiring coordinated global action, climate change responses are enacted and 
governed at multiple scales. The role of sub-national government is particularly 
critical in formulating and implementing spatial planning policies. At all levels, 
attentions have been focused on the two key areas of adaptation and mitigation, as 
elaborated below.  
[b]Climate change mitigation and adaptation 
The IPCC defines mitigation as ‘anthropogenic [human] intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases’; and adaptation as ‘adjustment in 
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC, 2007c, 
p869). While mitigation measures aim to avoid the adverse impacts of climate change 
in the long term, adaptation measures are designed to reduce unavoidable impacts of 
climate change in the short and medium terms. This is because even if concentrations 
of GHGs could be fixed at 2005 levels, the world could be committed to a long-term 
eventual warming of 2.4 °C. Therefore, strategies need to be in place for adaptation to 
temperature increases of at least 2 °C (Committee on Climate Change, 2008). 
 11 
As an integral part of sustainable development, mitigation of, and adaption to, climate 
change are closely linked and both have the same purpose: reducing undesirable 
consequences of climate change. However, for historical reasons, they have been split 
in both scientific and policy discourses. This is clearly reflected in the IPCC’s 
definition of the terms mentioned above and is also reflected in the structure of its 
Working Groups. During the initial climate change negotiations, adaptation was not 
only treated separately from mitigation, but also was given little attention. This, 
according to Swart and Raes (2007, p289), was because a focus on adaptation was 
considered, particularly in Europe, as distracting attention away from mitigation. 
Mitigation was given priority partly because climate change itself was conceived as 
an environmental problem similar to, for example, ozone depletion or acid rain which 
could be handled by setting targets and timetables (Munasinghe and Swart, 2004). 
Larger uncertainties about adaptation measures also played a part in initially paying 
limited attention to adaptation. Furthermore, mitigation was seen as the problem of 
developed countries (as the main emitters), while adaptation was considered as the 
problem of developing countries (as the main victims). Such artificial dualism began 
to lose its credibility as the global impact of climate change was increasingly 
demonstrated. It also became clear that climate change can be more usefully ‘framed 
as a developmental rather than an environmental problem’ (Swart and Raes, 2007, 
p289, our emphasis) given its fundamental roots in current production and 
consumption patterns.  Hence, it is now widely acknowledged that climate change is 
unavoidable and both natural ecosystems and human societies will be affected by its 
unmitigated impacts. As Swart and Raes (2007, p301) put it: ‘the question is not 
whether the climate has to be protected from humans or humans from climate, but 
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how both mitigation and adaptation can be pursued in tandem’.  They propose five 
ways for developing links between adaptation and mitigation measures, as follows: 
1 Avoiding trade-offs between the two and in designing adaptation measures taking 
into account the consequences for mitigation strategies (see chapter 2, this volume) 
2 Identifying synergies between the two in response to options within specific policy 
sectors, notably through spatial planning and design  
3 Enhancing both adaptive and mitigative response capacity simultaneously and 
putting such capacity into action particularly in developed countries (see chapter 18, 
this volume) 
4 Building institutional links between the two and bridging the communication gap 
between policy makers 
5 Mainstreaming climate policies into the overall sustainable development policies at 
all levels of governance (see chapter 11, this volume).  
An integrated view of climate change, as adopted by the IPCC, considers the 
dynamics of non-linear cause and effect relationships across all sectors, as depicted in 
Figure 1.2. The solid arrows show the cycle of cause and effect among the four 
quadrants and the blank arrow indicates societal responses to the impacts of climate 
change.  
 
Figure 1.2 An integrated view of climate change  
INSERT FIGURE 1.2 HERE 
Source: Adapted from IPCC, 2001, p3 
 
The existence of inertia and uncertainty in climate, ecological and socio-economic 
systems requires that precautionary principles and safety margins should be taken into 
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account when setting strategies, policies, targets and timetables. The combined effect 
of inertia and irreversibility in the interacting climate, ecological and socio-economic 
systems mean that anticipatory mitigation and adaptation measures are essential to 
minimise the time lag between policy and action and between technological 
development and its uptake. As Stern emphasises, ‘there is a high price to delay. 
Weak action in the next 10-20 years would put stabilisation (of GHG levels) at even 
550ppm beyond reach – and this level is already associated with risks’ (Quoted in The 
Times, 2006, P7).  
[a]The Roles of Spatial Planning  
Despite major uncertainties, the above summary has shown that the knowledge about 
causes and impacts of climate change has advanced substantially. There is also 
widespread recognition that the spatial configuration of cities and towns and the ways 
in which land is used and developed have significant implications for both adaptation 
to the adverse impacts of climate change and reduction of the emissions which are 
causing the change. Settlement forms and their impacts on the use of natural resources 
and levels of emissions are influenced by many complex factors, including available 
building technologies, land and property markets, the investment strategies of public 
and private institutions, public policies (related to, for example, planning, housing, 
transport, environment, and taxation), institutional traditions, social norms and 
cultures, and individual lifestyle choices and behaviour. Spatial planning interventions 
are therefore one factor among many in shaping settlement forms. 
We use the term spatial planning in its broader sense to refer to actions and 
interventions that are based on ‘critical thinking about space and place’ (RTPI, 2003). 
It involves not only legislative and regulatory frameworks for the development and 
use of land, but also the institutional and social resources through which such 
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frameworks are implemented, challenged and transformed. In this context, spatial 
planning is understood as place-based problem-solving aimed at sustainable 
development. It involves the processes through which options for the development of 
places are envisioned, assessed, negotiated, agreed and expressed in policy, regulatory 
and investment terms.   
National (and sometimes regional) planning systems vary greatly in terms of their 
priority, the scope and extent of their powers, their regulatory tools and the resources 
with which they work. Hence, their capacity to perform and deliver varies from place 
to place and from time to time.  Despite this diversity, mitigation of carbon emissions 
and adaptation to climate change impacts are increasingly recognised as major 
priorities for the development and delivery of spatial planning policy in many 
jurisdictions. Indeed, recognition of the complexity, uncertainty and irreversibility 
demonstrated by climate science is changing the nature and framing of spatial 
planning with an increasing expectation for it to play a part in mitigation and 
adaptation efforts.  
[b]Spatial planning policies 
Responding to climate change involves an iterative risk management process that 
includes both adaptation and mitigation and takes into account climate change 
damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity and attitudes to risk (IPCC, 2007). While 
there are strong interactions between mitigation and adaptation objectives, they each 
call for different or complementary planning tools. Indeed, integration of, and 
conflicts between, mitigation and adaptation priorities have become the focus of 
growing debate (see Chapters 2 and 3, this volume). At the same time, the importance 
of spatial and temporal scales in analysis has become critical. (see Chapter 17, this 
volume). Mitigation policies, that deliver major cuts in the carbon emissions of built 
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form and human activity, are necessarily led or coordinated at international or 
national levels, but sub-national innovation and leadership are essential to their 
delivery.  Aspirations to achieve low or zero-carbon development can drive 
innovation, new partnerships and competitive advantages for areas. Major, though 
inconsistent, advances have been made in agreeing emissions targets. However, such 
targets raise critical locational issues in terms of the capacity of jurisdictions, at all 
levels, to comply (see Chapters 7 and 8, this volume).  At the very least, it must be 
expected that area-based development pathways that can meet these targets should be 
identified through spatial planning processes. This requires assessments of the 
potential for renewable energy production and increases in the efficiency with which 
energy is both distributed and used. It also requires understanding of the potential for 
carbon sequestration, the most commonly recognised forms of which, so far, are 
forestry and habitat restoration and conservation (e.g. wetlands). Identifying such 
development paths also requires understanding of the networks of actors whose 
engagement and behaviours (whether organisational or individual) underpin delivery. 
It must also be based on a sound understanding of the markets, networks and 
technologies involved.  
As mentioned above, an important area of mitigation for which spatial policy can 
provide a powerful lever is the shaping of settlement forms and patterns which play a 
major, complex role in energy use and efficiency (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5, this 
volume). At the same time, mitigation strategies require setting new standards for the 
materials, construction and management used for buildings and infrastructure, as well 
as new approaches to waste and water management and infrastructure in order to 
harness low energy and closed-loop processes which cut the materials and energy 
intensity of development.  
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Policies for climate change adaptation require the development of techniques to 
explore and achieve consensus around the risks associated with possible change. The 
understanding of impacts in terms of probability requires investment in modelling, not 
only on the basis of physical measurements but also in terms of stakeholder 
engagement. Such models help reduce uncertainty and prioritise issues. Risk 
assessments (as discussed in chapters 15 and 16, this volume) support decision-
making on the allocation of land and design for resilience.  In this context, processes 
of scenario building are critical to scoping and weighting risks, involving stakeholders 
and designing options (chapters 17 and 18, this volume).   The focus of adaptation 
policy is not only on the direct allocation of land use but also on the details of 
locationally specific design, management and control. Such emphasis is very likely to 
highlight the importance of ecological functions of land in, for example, flood 
regulation and temperature control (Chapters 15, 16 and 19, this volume).  
[b]Spatial planning processes 
As demonstrated throughout this book, politics, values, governance, legislation and 
institutional capacity are integral to spatial planning. Indeed, spatial planning is a 
fundamental component of governance and a key determinant of governance capacity 
to respond effectively to climate change and other sustainable development 
challenges. Seen in this light, spatial planning processes provide key arenas in which  
integrated approaches to adaptation and mitigation can be designed, trade offs 
between these and other social and economic goals can be negotiated, conflicts of 
interests can be mediated  and intra- and inter-generational equity concerns can be 
considered. Furthermore, climate change is part of the larger challenge of sustainable 
development, and climate policies will be more effective if they are embedded in 
broader strategies designed to make development paths more sustainable. This further 
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reinforces the role of spatial planning in general, and spatial strategies and plans in 
particular, in integrating and coordinating related policy, investment and regulation. 
However, this role is often undermined or indeed resisted by vested interests. In the 
UK, for instance, while it is argued that, ‘the concept of sustainable development has 
been adopted more extensively and more firmly on a statutory basis in the planning 
system than in any other field’ (Owens, 1994, p87), this has not always been matched 
by its outcomes in terms of dominant development processes. Planning’s capacity to 
deliver cuts in carbon emissions has remained constrained by not only its own 
limitations, but also other policy, fiscal and investment responses. Examples include 
the taboo on raising fuel taxes, relatively low levels of investment in public transport 
and renewable energy, the ‘predict and provide’ response to air travel and poor 
integration of transport planning within spatial development frameworks. It is argued 
that this reflects a weak ecological modernisation approach in the UK planning 
system which asserts that a balance between economic, environmental and social 
objectives can be found, without clarifying limits, priorities and imperatives (see also 
chapters 11, 14 and 21, this volume). Such an approach has allowed government, at 
various levels, to avoid politically difficult choices (Davoudi, 2000; Davoudi and 
Layard, 2001). Some argue, for instance, that this balancing principle, which 
underpins most planning decisions, dooms the environment to incremental erosion 
(Levett, 1999).  
[a]Conclusion 
Whether the climate change agenda has, in fact, been able to introduce a systematic 
shift in spatial planning towards ecological priorities remains to be seen. On the one 
hand, the discursive shift from sustainability to climate change, which has become 
increasingly apparent, can be seen as a catalyst for a refocusing of the spatial planning 
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agenda on ecological issues. It has encouraged planners to re-think their processes, 
methods, skills and even perception of what constitute ‘good places’. Progress has 
been made in embedding some hard-won requirements for environmental and social 
sustainability into planning frameworks through mechanisms such as sustainability 
appraisals of plans and policies. Furthermore, there has been a proliferation of 
governmental reports, national planning policy statements and emerging legislation at 
both national and international levels demonstrating a wide-spread recognition of the 
pivotal role of spatial planning in delivering climate change mitigation and adaptation 
policies (see contributions from different countries in this volume).  
On the other hand, however, most of the progress has been made in a long period of 
unprecedented economic growth fuelled by incredibly buoyant property, and 
particularly housing, market. This period has now come to a halt. The developed 
world is heading towards a recession, the like of which has not been experienced 
since the great depression of the 1930s. Thus, the critical question is, how the 
downturn is going to affect the balance of priorities in spatial planning decisions. If 
history is anything to go by the answer is not promising. In 1979, faced with the 
1980s economic downturn, Michael Heseltine (the then UK Environment Secretary) 
declared that: ‘thousands of jobs every night are locked away in the filing trays of 
planning departments’ (Heseltine, 1979, p27) portraying planning as an obstructive 
and technocratic bureaucracy which would stifle wealth-creating private enterprise by 
unnecessary regulatory curbs (including environmental regulation) on development 
applications (Ward, 1994). As a result, planning policies which aimed at protecting 
the high street, green spaces and communities were discarded in favour of creating 
more jobs. Far too often social distribution and environmental interests were sidelined 
in favour of economic imperatives in the plan making processes (Davoudi et al, 
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1996). Today, planning is likely to come increasingly under similar pressures to set 
aside its sustainability goals, which may be perceived as ‘luxurious embellishments to 
developments rather than forming an integral and vital part of their success’ (Hartley, 
2009, p16).  
 However, as Stern has argued, ‘with strong, deliberate policy choices it is possible to 
‘decarbonise’ both developed and developing economies on the scale required for 
climate stabilisation, while maintaining economic growth in both’ (quoted in The 
Times, 2006, p.7).  Indeed, there are synergies to be made between the economic and 
ecological concerns if a long term perspective is developed. It is in this context that 
spatial planning can play a pivotal role not just as a technical means by which climate 
change policies can be delivered, but also as a democratic arena through which 
negotiations over seemingly conflicting goals can take place, diverse voices can be 
heard, and place-based synergies can be aimed for. This is a kind of planning that ‘is 
less and less about technical matters’ and more and more about the ‘critical 
appreciation and appropriation of ideas’ (Friedmann, 1998, p250). As the 
contributions to this book demonstrate, however, this also requires spatial planners to 
contribute high levels of knowledge, expertise and skill in building capacity for 
addressing climate change issues in uncertain times.    
[a]Notes 
1 Greenhouse gases (GHG) are the natural and anthropogenic gaseous components of 
the atmosphere which absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the 
spectrum of infrared radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface, atmosphere, and clouds. 
This causes the greenhouse effect and gradual warming of the Earth. The primary 
GHGs are: carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone 
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(O3). In addition, the Kyoto Protocol considers sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) as GHG. 
2 Radiative forcing is a measure of the influence that a human or natural factor has on 
the global climate. Positive forcing tends to warm the surface while negative forcing 
tends to cool it. Other complex aspects of radiative forcing include cloud formation 
and the role of nitrogen oxides.  Increase in aerosols in the atmosphere tends to have 
cooling effects but these are poorly understood (Committee on Climate Change, 
2008). 
3 The term ‘land use, land use change and forestry refers to the aggregated emissions 
from deforestation, biomass and burning, decay of biomass from logging and 
deforestation, decay of peat and peat fires, and excludes carbon uptake/removal 
4 Sea levels are rising because firstly water expands as it warms and secondly glacier 
ice is melting 
5 ETS works like any other commodities except that the trade is not in carbon but 
instead in certificates establishing the level of carbon which has not been emitted by 
the seller and hence can be bought by potential buyers. The carbon price was 
established by the Commission but remained volatile in the first phase of scheme 
(2005-08) because the allowance given to the industry was set at a high level. This 
was reduced in the second phase and hence pushed up the price of carbon, which 
stood at €20 per tonne in 2007 (The Economist, 2007, p10 survey) 
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